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Abstract
This paper reports on a social learning experiment that examines whether there
is bias in information acquisition. In contrast to the standard sequential social
learning experimental design of Anderson and Holt (1997) where subjects are given
both private and social information prior to guessing an unknown binary state of
the world, in our experiment, subjects must instead choose between receiving a
private signal or seeing the guesses made by previous subjects in the sequence (i.e.,
social information) before forming their own guess. By requiring subjects to make
this information choice at different points in the sequence, our within-subject design
allows us to separate biased from optimal information choices. Overall, we find that
once the number of previous guesses is 2 or greater, the majority of subjects exhibit
a bias in favor of choosing social rather than private information. However, there
is considerable heterogeneity, with a substantial minority behaving according to a
refined equilibrium prediction as well as some subjects consistently choosing social
information and others consistently choosing private information.
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1 Introduction
People often learn by observing others. While such behavior might be interpreted as evi-
dence of conformism, the insight from a large theoretical literature in economics beginning
with Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Banerjee (1992) is that apparent herd behavior can
be a rational response to the information contained in the actions of others. One unex-
plored alternative explanation is that imitative, herd behavior might reflect an individual
bias for social information. This paper seeks to differentiate between these two possible
explanations.
Laboratory evidence on social learning was first provided by Anderson and Holt (1997),
and their design has become a baseline model for later researchers (see Anderson and Holt
(2008) for a survey). Following the lead of Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Banerjee (1992),
this social learning literature employs a sequential-move structure, where each subject
takes a turn guessing the true state of the world. Prior to making these guesses, each
subject observes both an informative private signal and the guesses of the subjects who
moved earlier in the sequence. Many replications and modifications to this experimental
design have been studied and reported (see for example, Hung and Plott (2001); Celen
and Kariv (2004); Goeree et al. (2007); Ziegelmeyer et al. (2010)). Recently, Weizsa¨cker
(2010) combined data from 13 studies containing this base-line experimental design and
used a meta-analysis to conclude that people in general tend to overweight their private
information and thus underweight social information. In other words, people often fail to
learn from others when they should, due to a bias towards using private information.
In this paper, we examine the robustness of this bias toward private information by
modifying Anderson and Holt’s (1997) design. In our new experimental design, subjects
move sequentially (as in Anderson and Holt) but there is an additional stage to each
subject’s decision. In the first stage, subjects must make a choice between viewing social
information (the guesses of other players who moved earlier in the sequence) or receiving a
noisy but informative private signal. Subjects do not get to see both pieces of information,
“social” and “private,” as in classic social learning theory and the Anderson and Holt
design, just the one piece of information they chose to view. In the second stage, after
viewing the information they chose to receive, subjects must guess the true state of the
world, just as in Anderson and Holt. Furthermore, each subject participates in several
different sequences of two different lengths, making decisions in different locations in
theses sequences. This design enables identification of individual biases for or against
social information as well as evaluation of whether individuals comply with the single
piece of information they have chosen to receive.
We use this experimental design to test a theoretical prediction offered by Ma (2018),
who shows that in equilibrium private information is chosen by those occupying early
positions in the sequence, but social information is chosen by those moving later in the
sequence. Intuitively, social information is not valuable until a sufficient number of private
signals have been drawn and guesses based on those signals have been recorded. By
separating information choice from information use, our experimental design enables us
to directly examine whether subjects choose information optimally given their position in
the queue, or they instead have a bias for or against social or private information.
We find that aggregate behavior approximates the qualitative predictions of this theory
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in the sense that earlier moving subjects are more likely to choose private information
while later moving subjects are more likely to choose social information. However, we find
that for a significant majority of subjects, the switch from private to social information
comes too early. The theory predicts that this switch-over should occur at position four,
while in our data it occurs in period three. Importantly, choosing social information
at position three is also not empirically optimal, as some fraction of subjects in earlier
positions fail to comply with the information they receive, which makes social information
less accurate than theoretically predicted.
We attribute the premature switch-over to choosing social information to three types
of neglect on the part of subjects. The first is “tie neglect”, wherein subjects at posi-
tion three overvalue social information because they do not anticipate that the first two
players’ guesses could contradict one another. Second, the switch to social information
at position three reduces the accuracy of social information at position four; we refer
to the failure to correct for duplicates in social information “redundancy neglect” (after
Eyster et al. (2015)). Finally, there is a substantial tendency by subjects at all positions
to guess contrary to the information they chose, which also erodes the value of social
information. The failure to adjust for such non-compliance with the information received
is a phenomenon we refer to as “non-compliance neglect”. Overall, we find that the em-
pirically optimal choice, as opposed to the equilibrium recommendation at position four
is to continue to choose private information. Yet, as was the case at position three, a
majority of subjects at position four also choose social information. Thus, our results
challenge previous findings from imputed information use analysis (Weizsa¨cker (2010))
that subjects in general overweight private information relative to social information.
Because we obtain precisely the opposite result, it suggests that the bias toward private
information in the standard setting may not arise from a persistent cognitive failure,
but rather is an artefact of the standard design. There, following social information is
typically empirically optimal except at the very start of the sequence, so mistakes are more
likely to be in the direction of private information. Here, choosing private information is
empirically optimal, so mistakes are towards excessive choice of social information.
In addition to examining subjects’ information choices at different positions within a
sequence, we explore whether subjects behave differently when making decisions as part
of a larger- (4) or smaller-sized (2) group. By comparing the same subjects’ behavior
when they are in the second position of a “Group” sequence of four subjects, and when
placed in the final position of a “Pair” sequence of two subjects, we find that subjects
tend to choose private information more often when their decisions can be observed by
others later in the sequence (as in the 4-player group).
At the individual level, we identify subjects who always choose private or social infor-
mation, irrespective of position. Nevertheless, the overall bias we identify is that social
information is chosen more often and earlier than it should be, as the empirically optimal
strategy here is to always choose private information.
There are several papers related to this one. Ku¨bler and Weizsa¨cker (2004) modify
the Anderson and Holt experimental design by introducing a cost for private signals.
In their experiment, social information is freely available by default, but agents have to
decide whether to purchase a private signal at a small cost. This design yields the strong
prediction that only the first player should buy a private signal. They report that there
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is excessive purchase of private information. By contrast, Celen and Hyndman (2012)
make private information freely available, but subjects must pay to make social links
to learn about others’ choices. Similarly, they find that subjects buy too much costly
social information. Relative to the symmetric design of our paper, in both of these earlier
experiments, the two forms of information are treated asymmetrically.
De Filippis et al. (2016) also modify the Anderson and Holt setup but by adding a
belief elicitation stage after subjects observe the decisions of others and once again after
they have received their own private signal. This design enables them to assess the extent
to which subjects update their beliefs, conditional on each type of information received.
Their evidence also points to an overweighting of private information, which arises from
the asymmetric manner in which agents update beliefs.
Trevino (2017), in a experiment on social learning with a somewhat different design,
finds that subjects overweight social information, due to a different form of neglect than
those considered here. Subjects respond to the observed actions of others that are not in
fact correlated with the state of the world which determines the observer’s payoffs.
Goeree and Yariv (2015) designed an experiment aimed at disentangling information-
based herding from an intrinsic taste for conformity. In their experiment, before making
a decision, subjects face a choice between an informative private signal or the history of
actions of predecessors who have not chosen a private signal (word-of-mouth information).
In equilibrium, nobody should choose the latter type of social information since it is
uninformative. However, Goeree and Yariv (2015) report that approximately one-third
of information choices are social, and they conclude that for many people, herding might
be a rule of thumb, rationalizing this overweighting of social information.
Importantly, private information is always strictly optimal in Goeree and Yariv (2015),
and thus, in their framework, errors can only run in one direction - towards social informa-
tion. Furthermore, the long sequences of decisions employed in the existing social learning
literature, including Weizsa¨cker (2010), imply that many subjects make decisions in po-
sitions where following social information is indeed optimal. Thus, errors again run in
only in one direction, but in this case towards private information. By contrast, in our
setup, either social or private information can be optimal depending on the situation,
which allows for errors in either direction.
The above sequential move games differ from the “balanced” design of Duffy et al.
(2018), who also study subjects’ choice of social or private information in an experiment
where the aim is to guess the true state of the world. However, in their design, subjects
do not move sequentially as in the standard social learning experiments. Instead, in Duffy
et al., all N players have to individually and simultaneously choose whether to use social
or private information. The optimal choice depends on the persistence of the state of
the world which is subject to change from one period to the next. They find that most
subjects choose information rationally, but there exists a sizable and approximately equal
fraction of subjects who have a clear bias for social or for private information. We adopt
their labels “herd animals” for those with a bias for social information and “lone wolves”
for those with a bias for private information. However, in contrast to Duffy et al., subjects
in the present experiment choose private or social information sequentially and the state
of the world they are learning about does not change over time, just as in the standard
social learning model.
3
2 Model and Theoretical Predictions
In this section, we outline the theoretical model and equilibrium predictions that we
use as a benchmark of rational play. To do this we use a refinement of equilibrium
based on perfection, the idea of taking best responses to small trembles. This section
is based on a much more detailed analysis in Ma (2018). Alternative predictions based
on persistent mistakes (quantal response equilibrium) and the actual empirical error rate
(what is empirically optimal) will be given in Section 4 below.
We assume N players form a sequence and each player has a commonly known and ex-
ogenously determined position n in that sequence, {1, 2,..., N}. The parameter θ ∈ {0, 1}
represents the state of the world. Each of the two states has an equal prior probability of
0.5. Players sequentially make a decision (guess) dn ∈ D = {0, 1} as to what they believe
the state of the world to be. The payoff to each player is 1 if dn = θ, that is, if the guess
matches the state, and 0 otherwise. Players seek to maximize their expected utility.
Before making the decision dn, each player can choose one of the two available pieces
of information in ∈ I(n) = {sn, hn}. First, she could receive an independently generated
private signal sn ∈ S = {0, 1}. The accuracy of this signal is fixed and commonly known
to be q. Specifically, Pr(sn = 0|θ = 0) = Pr(sn = 1|θ = 1) = q and Pr(sn = 0|θ = 1) =
Pr(sn = 1|θ = 0) = 1− q for all players. Signals are imperfect but informative because we
assume 0.5 < q < 1. We refer to the choice of receiving a private noisy signal as the choice
of “private” information. Second, the player could choose to view a complete history of
the decisions made by all predecessors, hn. Specifically, h1 is the empty set, h2 = {d1},
h3 = {d1, d2}, h4 = {d1, d2, d3}, and more generally, hn ∈ Dn−1. It should be noted
that hn includes only the decisions of others, dn, and does not include the information
observed by others, ik, k < n, nor what type of information predecessors have chosen to
view. We refer to this second option, to see the history of decisions made thus far in the
sequence, hn, as a choice of “social” information.
Therefore, a player has to solve two problems: first, given her position in a sequence,
which information to choose; second, after observing the information she chooses, what
guess to make about the state of the world. A strategy for player n is a thus pair of two
mappings mn = (m
i,md). The first, mi, gives a player’s choice between private and social
information as a function of her position in the sequence. The second, md, maps from the
information she then sees to a final decision. A strategy profile is a sequence of strategies
m = {m1,m2, ...,mN}.
We use perfect equilibrium (PE), due to Selten (1975), as a solution concept. This
is in contrast to the previous literature on social learning which uses (Perfect) Bayesian
Nash equilibrium and deals with multiple equilibria by employing tie-breaking rules (see,
for example, Banerjee (1992)). PE breaks indifference in favor of private information
because the possibility that previous players could have made mistakes lowers the expected
accuracy of social information, which relies on the choices of previous players, but does
not affect the accuracy of private information. We see this as a reasonable refinement as a
positive error rate is inevitable in the actual empirical situation of a laboratory experiment.
Consequently, the empirical return to social information will surely be somewhat below
its theoretical level, breaking indifference in the direction of private information.1
1Weizsa¨cker (2010) thus suggests that the real benchmark for rationality is whether a strategy is
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We look for a pure strategy PE. The second decision a player makes, regarding the
use of the observed information, is straightforward: players should follow the information
that they observe. In the case of the private signal, since it is informative (q > 0.5),
subjects should follow it. As for social information, since all subjects in a sequence face
the same true state and are individually incentivized in the same way, all participants have
an incentive to follow their predecessors. Thus the main question is which information to
choose to observe in the first place. We find the following.
Proposition 1. There is a unique PE. In this PE, information choices i∗n are:
i∗n =
{
sn, if n ≤ 3
hn, if n ≥ 4
(1)
In short, the prediction of this equilibrium is that private information should be chosen
in positions 2 and 3, but social information should be chosen from position 4 onwards.
Note that at position 3 this prediction runs counter to the simple “more is better” heuris-
tic. That rule ignores the possibility that the two previous guesses may “tie” in that
players 1 and 2 make opposite guesses. Thus, in fact, social information at position 3 is
no more informative than private. But in PE, given even vanishingly small trembles by
other players, player 3 must choose private information.
The proof of the above result and details of other equilibria that are eliminated by
perfection are given in Ma (2018), but the main argument is as follows. In the absence
of trembles, player 2 would be indifferent between private and social information because
they both give her access to one informative signal of accuracy q. However, given trembles
by other players, first, the accuracy of private information remains constant at q, and,
second, there is a positive probability of player 1 not following her signal. Hence, the
accuracy of social information for player 2 is necessarily less than the accuracy of the
private signal q. Therefore, Player 2’s best response is to choose private information and
to follow it. Note that this implies that in any PE, player 2 chooses private information
and follows it. For player 3 as for player 2, in the absence of trembles, social information
is equally informative as private. However, if she places positive probability on player
1 not following her signal, player 2 choosing social information and not following player
1 and player 2 choosing private information but not following the signal, then private
information is the best reply for player 3. Thus, player 3 chooses private information
(and follows it) in any PE. Finally, the best response for player 4 could be private or
social information depending on the exact mix of trembles he faces, but in the limit as
the trembles go to zero, his best response must be to choose social information which,
because in the PE players 1 to 3 choose private information and follow it, gives access to
three independent signals.2
“empirically optimal”, that is, taking into account the actual error rate in the experiment. In Appendix
A, we indeed find that empirically it is optimal to choose private information at those positions where a
player would be indifferent in the absence of error.
2In contrast, this equilibrium is not the unique trembling hand perfect equilibrium (THPE). This
is because a THPE is a perfect equilibrium in the agent normal form, which in this context implies
that we separate a player’s choice of information from the decision whether to follow the information
she subsequently receives. Thus we can support other equilibria as THPE by, for example, choosing a
sequence of mixed profiles in which the error rate of player 2 in following private information is higher
than the error rate of player 2 when following social information, such that the best response of player
2 to such mixed profiles at the information choice stage to be social information. We do not see this as
behaviorally or empirically plausible but we report it for completeness.
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3 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of two main parts. At the beginning of the first part subjects
were given written instructions that were read aloud so that the rules of the game were
public (if not common) knowledge. Then, subjects completed a comprehension quiz to
verify their understanding of these instructions, before moving on to making decisions in
the first part using networked computer terminals. Once the first part of the experiment
was completed, the experiment was paused, and subjects were given written instructions
for the second part, which were also read aloud, and were also followed by a comprehension
quiz. Then subjects made decisions in the second part.3
At the start of each experimental session, all subjects were randomly and anonymously
divided into groups of four subjects. Subjects remained in the same group of four subjects
for the duration of the session. Then, each subject made decisions in two formations, a
N = 4-subject “Group” (G) formation, and a N = 2-subject “Pair” (P) formation
(involving a further random division of the four subject grouping into two fixed pairs).
Apart from the formation size, the decision-making tasks and the environment of the
“Group” and the “Pair” formations are identical.
Each session consisted of a number of rounds. At the beginning of each new round,
subjects were arranged in a randomly determined sequential order within their formation
(i.e., a 4-subject “group” or a 2-subject “pair”). For each formation, subjects were in-
structed that one of two urns, the “Black” urn or the “Red” urn, would be chosen with
equal 0.5 probability and would represent the state of the world for their formation and
for duration of that round. Each urn contains three balls. The black urn contains two
black balls and one red ball while the red urn contains two red balls and one black ball.
Subjects do not know the urn that is chosen (the state of the world for each round), but
they do know that each urn is equally likely to have been chosen as well as the number
of red and black balls in each urn.
The round then begins with the subject in the first position of the sequence being
privately shown a signal of the true state of the world, which amounts to a ball drawn
(with replacement) from the urn chosen for the formation (group or pair, henceforth the
“formation urn”) which by design has accuracy q = 2/3. After viewing this signal, this
first subject is asked to provide his or her individually incentivized guess as to which
urn (“Black” or “Red”) was chosen by nature as their formation’s urn for that round.
Each subsequent subject in a given sequence, prior to making their guess, has to choose
to observe either: 1) a private signal in the form of a a new random ball draw (with
replacement) from their formation’s urn (again, with accuracy of q = 2/3); or 2) social
information, in the form of the urn color guesses, black or red, (and not the signals!)
made by all previous subjects in the sequence for their formation for that round. After
seeing the information they chose to view (private or social), subjects then submit their
individually incentivized guess as to the true state of the world, i.e., the color of their
formation’s urn (black or red).
After all decisions in a round are made, the color of the formation urn is revealed. Each
subject is paid a fixed payment of £5 if her urn guess coincides with their formation’s
3Instructions used in the experiment are included in the Appendix.
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urn in one randomly selected round, and nothing otherwise. As for feedback, at the
end of each round, subjects learned the history of the actual urn chosen for the round
(“Black” or “Red”), their urn guesses, the type of information they selected, and the
content of both the private signal and the social information, the history hn, (i.e., both
the information they chose to see as well as the other piece of information they did not
choose to see). This feedback choice was made to allow subjects to learn the value of the
two types of information they could choose, private or social, and to dissuade subjects
from experimenting out of curiosity. By contrast, subjects never observe the private
signals of others nor the information choices made by others during or after any round of
the experiment.4
Subjects were informed that they would experience each position in the sequence
exactly 6 times, but that their position in any particular round would be randomly de-
termined. Thus, they faced 24 rounds of the “Group” formation and 12 rounds of the
“Pair” formation. To control for potential “order effects”, we conducted two treatment
orderings, the “Group-Pair” treatment ordering (GP) and the reverse order “Pair-Group”
treatment ordering (PG). Specifically, in PG treatment ordering, in the first part of the
experiment, subjects made decisions in the “Pair” formation for 12 rounds followed by
making decisions in the “Group” formation in the second part for 24 rounds. In the GP
treatment ordering, the order of the two parts is reversed.5
After these two main parts of the experiment, the experimenter invited two volunteers
from the subject participants to roll physical dice to randomly select two rounds from the
“Group” part and one round from the “Pair” part for real payment. Thus, each round
of the experiment had an equal, 1/12 chance of being selected for payment. In the third
part, subjects were offered a fixed payment of £3 for completing a survey that included
demographic information, cognitive reflection questions, and further questions designed
to identify individual non-cognitive traits (see Appendix D for details). Finally, subjects
were invited to submit open-ended comments on their decisions in the experiment.
The experiment was conducted in eight 16-subject sessions at the Behavioural Labo-
ratory at the University of Edinburgh (BLUE), using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). The participants were randomly recruited by the BLUE recruitment system and
most were students at the University of Edinburgh. Subjects could only participate in a
single experimental session. Thus, no subject had any prior exposure to our experimental
design.
To summarize, there were 4 sessions for each of two treatment orderings, GP (Group-
Pair) and PG (Pair-Group), each session involving 16 subjects (for a total of 128 subjects
in 8 sessions). Each subject made 24 information choices (18 in a Group formation and 6 in
a Pair formation), and 36 urn guesses (24 in a Group formation and 12 in a Pair formation).
Each session lasted approximately 1 hour 44 minutes, and the average earnings (including
£5 show-up fee and £3 reward for completing post-experimental survey) were £17.30 in
the GP ordering and £18.23 in the PG ordering.
4Due to a non-consequential coding error, in two sessions of the PG treatment ordering, the content
of social information was not displayed in the end-of-round feedback only in the 10th round (out of 12
rounds) to 8 subjects in the “Pair” formation. As all subjects’ decisions were coded correctly, and since
we could not detect any difference between the decisions of the affected subjects and of the rest of the
sample, we decided to retain the data from those sessions. The code was corrected for all other sessions.
5We found no systematic order effect - see Appendix C.
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4 Results: Overview
In this section, we focus on our two main questions: which information was chosen, and
whether the chosen information was used optimally. We are particularly interested in how
the information choices compare with equilibrium predictions.
Importantly, whatever the information chosen (private or social), there is never any
payoff-relevant motive to contradict that information and guess the opposite state of the
world. That is, it is always optimal to comply with the information received. Thus, an
important measure of the rationality of subjects’ choices is information compliance, or
the rate of correct use of the available information.
In what follows, we will use P1 and P2 to represent subjects in positions 1 and 2,
respectively, of the Pair formation and G1-G4 to represent subjects in positions 1-4, re-
spectively, of the Group formation. Given the binary setup of our experiment, there are
four potential strategies combining information choice and information use (or compli-
ance). We write pf to denote the strategy of choosing private information and following
it, and pn to denote the strategy of choosing private information and not following it,
i.e., guessing that the state of the world is the opposite to the information received. The
remaining two strategies are to choose social information and to follow or not follow it,
denoted by sf and sn. The latter strategies are more complicated than the two private
information strategies, and require more detailed definition, as discussed later in this
section.
Position
Information Choice Information Use
Private Social % pf % pn % sf % sn
P1 – – 91.8 8.2 – –
P2 72.4 27.6 66.9 5.5 24.3 3.3
G1 – – 91.8 8.2 – –
G2 82.8 17.2 77.1 5.7 15.4 1.8
G3 40.9 59.1 37.6 3.3 48.7 10.4
G4 16.4 83.6 14.2 2.2 77.3 6.3
Table 1: Overall frequencies of information choice and compliance by position. The first two columns
give the frequency with which private and social information were chosen by subjects at different positions
in the two formation treatments, P and G, while the remaining columns report on the frequency of the
four possible strategies: pf , pn, sf , and sn. Modal information choice and information use strategies are
in bold.
The aggregate statistics of subjects’ behavior are presented in Table 1. Notice first that
the private information compliance rate by the first players in each sequence, i.e., those
at positions P1 and G1, happened to be the same. Furthermore, this average compliance
rate of 91.8% across these two first positions is higher than the average compliance rate
of 89.9% (χ2 = 4.3921, p = 0.0361) by the first players across the 14 studies analyzed in
meta-study by Ziegelmeyer et al. (2013).6 Thus, the average non-compliance rate of 8.2%
by the first players provides empirical justification for the perfect equilibrium reported in
Proposition 1.
6Our own calculations are based on Ziegelmeyer et al. (2013)’s dataset, which refines the dataset of
Weizsa¨cker (2010) and includes an additional study. The meta-dataset contains a total of 31,086 decisions
made by more than 3,000 participants in 14 information cascade experiments.
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Finding 1. The average private information compliance rate by the first players in each
sequence (at positions P1 and G1) is 91.8%.
We will address subjects’ compliance with information choices more fully later on in
section 6.
As for our main object of interest, information choice, Table 1 reveals that the fre-
quency of social (private) information choice is increasing (decreasing) with a subject’s
position in formation. In particular, in formation treatment G, the majority of subjects
switch to choosing social information at position 3, with the proportion of social informa-
tion choices increasing to 83.6% at position 4. Finally, as we will discuss later in Section
5.1, the frequency of choosing private information at position P2 is significantly lower than
at position G2, even though the situation is identical from a rational choice perspective.
Position PE More Is Better Emp. Optimal LQRE (µ = 7.33)
G1/P1 Pr(pf) = 1 Pr(pf) = 1 Pr(pf) = 1 Pr(pf) = 0.920
G2/P2 Pr(pf) = 1 Pr(pf) = 1 Pr(pf) = 1 Pr(pf) + Pr(pn) = 0.539
G3 Pr(pf) = 1 Pr(pf) = 0 Pr(pf) = 1 Pr(pf) + Pr(pn) = 0.539
G4 Pr(pf) = 0 Pr(pf) = 0 Pr(pf) = 1 Pr(pf) + Pr(pn) = 0.504
Table 2: Private information choice rates including the frequency of the strategy pf
(choose private and follow) and pn (choose private and not follow): PE predictions and
behavioral alternatives.
The optimality of information choice and use can be assessed against the theoretical
predictions in Table 2. First, observe that the information choices reported in the first
two columns of Table 1 bear some qualitative similarities to the PE theoretical predictions
in Table 2 (first column). That is, the majority of subjects choose private information
at position 2 and social information at position 4. Second, the biggest departure from
the PE predictions is at position G3, where a majority of subjects (59.1%) choose social
information, contrary to the equilibrium prediction of private information choice.
Instead, the majority of subjects seem to behave as if they follow a simple “more
is better” heuristic. This alternative theory predicts that social information would be
chosen once it contains at least two pieces of information, rather than one piece of private
information (see Table 2, second column). This “more is better” prediction differs from
the PE prediction only at position G3, where, due to equal priors, the content of social
information might be completely uninformative due to “ties” in previous guesses.
Finding 2. The majority of subjects follow the predictions of the PE at positions 2 and
4, but go against the PE prediction at position 3, of the group treatment, choosing social
information rather than private information. Overall, subjects exhibit a bias in favor of
social information relative to the PE, with this bias being even stronger relative to the
empirically optimal strategy.
The above result can be compared to two other possible alternatives. First, as
Weizsa¨cker (2010) suggests, it is possible that rational subjects optimize with respect
to the actual behavior of their opponents rather than some idealized equilibrium. To
evaluate this alternative, the third column of Table 2 reports the empirically optimal
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strategies calculated using the empirical data of Table 1 (see Appendix A for details).
Choosing private information remains the empirically optimal choice at positions G2/P2
and G3. However, the preceding subjects’ compliance with their information choices is
so low, and their choices of social information at position G3 are so frequent, that the
empirical expected return of 0.6622 from choosing social information and following it at
position G4 is very slightly lower than the expected return of 2
3
(the signal accuracy)
from choosing and following private signal.7 Thus, despite the empirical payoffs favoring
the use of private information in all positions, we find substantial frequencies of social
information choice, particularly in the last two positions of the group formation treatment.
The second alternative is a perturbed equilibrium concept, Logit Quantal Response
Equilibrium (LQRE). This noisy best response equilibrium model provides a predicted
mixed strategy (over the four strategies pf, pn, sf and sn) at each position. This mixed
strategy depends on an accuracy parameter µ (see Goeree, Holt and Palfrey 2016), which
we estimate to be 7.33 (see Appendix B for details). The estimated LQRE mixture
probability of choosing private information (equal to the sum of the frequencies of pf and
pn) is reported in the last column of Table 2. However, neither the empirically optimal
analysis nor the LQRE estimates predict the popularity of social information at positions
G3 and G4.
Interpreting strategies based on choices of social information is complicated in position
G3, where the guesses of the two previous subjects might differ, resulting in ambiguous
social information or a “tie”. However, if subjects use available information suboptimally,
the subject in position G2 is less likely to be correct compared with the subject in position
G1, as position G2 allows for an additional strategy of misusing social information. Indeed,
as Appendix A reports, the empirical frequency that player 2 is correct is 0.6386, slightly
lower than the corresponding frequency of 0.6393 for player 1 (and both are lower than
the accuracy of private information, 2
3
).
Indeed, as Table 1 shows, social information was chosen in 59.1% of observations
at G3, which is not consistent with subjects in position G3 simply randomizing 50:50
(according to a binomial test, p = 0.0000). When social information was chosen at G3,
the information received was unambiguous (i.e., there were no ties so that G1 = G2)
in 62.6% of such social information choices, and this social information was followed in
94.4% of such cases (interpreted as sf); in the remaining 5.6% of such cases, subjects
choose the opposite of the identical two previous guesses, which was interpreted as sn.
Among the remaining 37.4% of social information choices at G3, the information received
was ambiguous, i.e., the first two players’ guesses were split, so that there was a tie
in guesses for each of the two possible states (G1 6= G2). Among such cases of “tied”
social information at G3, 62.4% of guesses coincided with the G1 guess (and thus were
interpreted as sf), while 37.6% of guesses coincided with the G2 guess, contradicting the
G1 guess, and thus were interpreted as sn.
7The empirically optimal strategy of choosing and following private information at position G4 might
not have been immediately apparent; indeed, we could only calculate this ex-post. Still, since the game
was played for a repeated number of rounds, and subjects received feedback on both types of information,
learning the empirically optimal strategy cannot be ruled out.
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Figure 1: Group Effects: Private information choices at G2 (y-axis) vs. P2 (x-axis), for each of 128
subjects. The size of the bubbles is proportional to the number of subjects (stated within each bubble)
with a given (x, y) value. The bubbles located above the 45◦ line indicate potential group effects.
5 Results: Within-Subject Patterns of Choices
Our within-subject design allows us to compare individual subject behavior at different
positions in the sequence of both formation treatments P and G. We are interested in the
extent to which individual subject behavior is consistent with the theoretical predictions
of Table 2, and how departures from these predictions might be explained.
5.1 Group Effects: Information Choices at G2 vs. P2
As Table 1 reveals, when being second in a sequence, the same subject population chooses
private information 82.8% of the time when in the group formation treatment as G2, but
only 72.4% of the time when in the pair formation treatment as P2 (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test for matched pairs, z = 3.98, p = 0.0001). Figure 1 further depicts the rates of private
information choices at both positions P2 and G2 by each individual subject, with the
prevalence of such combination of choices depicted by the relative size of the bubbles.
The PE prediction is for 100% private information choices at both P2 and G2. While
56 out of 128 (or 43.8%) observations are at the PE prediction, the majority of subjects’
choices differ from this prediction, with pairs of choices lying above the 45◦ line indicating
a greater tendency for the same individual subject to choose private information when in
G2 than when in P2.
Finding 3. Subjects choose private information more frequently when they are followed
by others in the sequence (i.e. in a group formation).
The latter finding, which we refer to as the “group effect,” is not predicted by the
standard theory but has at least two possible behavioral explanations. First, subjects
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may simply think differently in a larger group of size four than in a pair of players. In
our setup, the payoff relevant interaction between two players in a pair is very limited;
all that matters is the P1 player’s rate of compliance with the signal. By contrast, the
group setting provides a more complex framing as both compliance with the signal and
the information choices of players in the group have payoff relevant consequences.
Second, subjects may have efficiency motivations that are triggered only in the group
setting. As Banerjee (1992) has pointed out, following others in a sequential learning
setup can generate a negative herding externality, reducing social welfare. Indeed, Hung
and Plott (2001) find that when standard payoffs in social learning models are replaced
by majority rule, cascades form significantly less often. As Engelmann and Strobel (2004)
have documented, albeit in a different context, some subjects may have concerns for
efficiency, desiring to maximize the sum of all participants’ payoffs, and not just their
own. In the pairs treatment, there is no room for such efficiency concerns as the subject
in position 2 (P2) is the terminal player. By contrast, in the group setting, the subject
in position 2 (G2) is followed by two more players. Thus, if subjects are able to identify
the negative externality of choosing social information and have efficiency concerns, they
would choose private information more frequently in position G2 than in the position P2.8
5.2 Tie Neglect: Information Choices at G3
As Section 2 showed, the PE optimal strategy at position G3 is to select private infor-
mation and to follow it, as, two equally precise independent pieces of information are no
more informative than only one piece of information with the same precision. Intuitively,
the guesses by players G1 and G2 might contradict one another, or “tie”, rendering social
information at G3 uninformative. In our binary setup the expected frequency of such tie
is high enough to offset the informational advantages of the situation when the guesses
instead coincide. In particular, the theoretical probability of ties in social information at
G3 with full compliance is 2q(1− q) (or 44.4% for our parametrization of q = 2/3). Such
tie neglect can only happen in odd-numbered positions like G3, G5, and so on, where
social information consists of an even number of previous decisions.9
Both PE and LQRE account for such ties and prescribe the choice of private infor-
mation at G3 (see Table 2), predicting equal frequency of private information choice at
positions 2 and 3. Yet as Table 1 reports, 59.1 percent of subjects choose social informa-
tion at position G3 as compared with 27.6 (17.2) percent choosing social information at P2
(G2), suggesting tie-neglect. This result is disaggregated by individual subject choice pairs
at G3 vs P2 (left panel) and G3 vs. G2 (right panel) in Figure 2, demonstrating that the
frequency of private information choice at G3 is significantly lower than that at positions
P2 and G2 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test z = 5.96, p = 0.0000 and z = 8.228, p = 0.0000,
respectively). Specifically, in the G3 vs. P2 comparison (Figure 2, left panel), more ob-
8Given our parameterization, the success rate of a subject who chooses and follows social information
in position G4 increases by 10.3% when all of her predecessors reveal their private information - see Ma
(2018).
9The problem of “ties” is undoubtedly familiar to readers of this paper who serve as journal editors.
Two referee reports may result in a split verdict on the suitability of a paper for publication. In that
case, this “social” information may well be less useful than another private draw, either from a third
referee report, or from a careful reading of the paper by the editor him/herself.
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Figure 2: Tie Neglect: Number of private information choices at G3 (y-axis) versus at P2 (x-axis in
the left panel) and G2 (x-axis in the right panel), for each of 128 subjects. The size of the bubbles is
proportional to the number of subjects (stated within each bubble) with a given (x, y) value. The bubbles
located below the 45◦ line indicate potential “tie neglect”.
servations are located below the 45◦ line, suggesting that more subjects choose private
information less frequently (and thus choose social information more frequently) at po-
sition G3 as compared to their terminal position P2 in the “Pair” formation. This tie
neglect is even more pronounced when comparing pairs of decisions at G3 and G2 (Figure
2, right panel).
Tie neglect (ignoring the possibility of independent signals contradicting one another)
differs from redundancy neglect (the failure to recognize that prior actions may be corre-
lated due to social learning) which was first documented by Eyster et al. (2015). Both
contribute to sub-optimally over-reliance on social information (and could jointly be due
to subjects following simple rules of thumb such as evaluating information simply by
counting the number of guesses it includes).
Finding 4. Subjects choose social information more frequently at position G3 than at
positions G2 and P2.
5.3 PE: Information Choices at G4 vs. P2 and G4 vs. G2
We next examine whether subjects behaved according to the theoretical predictions at
position G4. As Table 2 indicates, both the PE and the LQRE predict that the frequency
of private information choice at G4 should be lower than at P2, G2, and G3. However, the
empirically optimal choice involves never choosing social information at G4. As discussed
in the previous section, subjects might be susceptible to social information bias at position
G3 due to “tie neglect”, and to private information bias at position G2 due to “group
effects”.
Thus, the pair of frequencies with which each subject chose private information at
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Figure 3: PE: Number of private information choices at G4 (y-axis) versus at P2 (x-axis in the left
panel) and versus at G2 (x-axis in the right panel), for each of 128 subjects. The size of the bubbles
is proportional to the number of subjects (stated within each bubble) with a given (x, y) value. The
bubbles located below the 45◦ line indicate a tendency in favor of the PE information choice.
the terminal positions G4 and P2, as shown in the left panel of Figure 3, provides us
with insight into subjects’ abilities to select information according to the PE. The large
cluster at the bottom right corner, around the coordinate pair (1,0), represents subjects
who behave according to the PE and always choose private information at P2 and social
information at G4. The smaller cluster at the bottom left corner, around the coordinate
pair (0,0), represents subjects who always choose social information, which is consistent
with the PE prediction at position G4 but not at position P2. The other smaller cluster
at the top right corner, around the coordinate pair (1,1), represents subjects who always
choose private information, and whose behavior is consistent with the PE at position
P2 but not at position G4. The two extreme clusters of “herd animals” (who always
choose social information at coordinate pair (0,0)) and “lone wolves” (who always choose
private information at coordinate pair (1,1)) were also found earlier in Duffy et al. (2018).
Overall, as the left panel of Figure 3 makes clear, subjects choose private information at
G4 much less often than at P2 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test z = 9.06, p = 0.0000).
While choosing private information at every position turned out to be empirically
optimal, as well as the most frequent choice according to the LQRE prediction, observe
that the number of such “lone wolves” is comparable to the number of “herd animals” -
whose behavior is suboptimal. Furthermore, while the combination of private information
choices at positions G4 and G2 is a noisier indicator of subject’s optimality because of
potential group effects, nevertheless the right panel of Figure 3 presents a very similar
result to the left panel (G4 vs. P2), namely: subjects choose private information at G4
much less often than at G2 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test z = 9.62, p = 0.0000).
Finding 5. A majority of subjects switch from choosing private information at positions
P2 and G2 to choosing social information at position G4, in accordance with the PE (see
Section 2), but there are also some (suboptimal) “herd animals” and (empirically optimal)
“lone wolves”.
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Figure 4: Redundancy Neglect: Proportion of private information choices at G4 (y-axis) versus at G3
(x-axis), for each of 128 subjects. The size of the bubbles is proportional to the number of subjects
(stated within each bubble) with a given (x, y) value. The bubbles located below the 45◦ line indicate
tendency for PE/redundancy neglect information choice.
5.4 Redundancy Neglect: Information Choices at G4 vs. G3
As shown above, subjects display a remarkable degree of PE behavior at position G4,
involving the choice of social information. While the return to social information at
G4 is reduced by the preceding subjects not following their information (either social or
private), we show in Appendix A that choosing private information at G4 is the empirically
optimal strategy primarily because of the popularity of social information at G3. Indeed,
if subjects in position G2 or G3 choose social information, their guesses will be correlated
with the guesses of the previous subjects, making social information at position G4 less
informative. That is, the frequency with which social information is chosen at G4 suggests
“redundancy neglect”, as defined by Eyster et al. (2015), the failure of subjects to realize
that guesses at G3 are not in fact independent of guesses at G1 and G2.
Figure 4 plots the distribution of each subjects’ paired frequencies of information
choices at positions G4 and G3. The big cluster at the bottom left corner around the
coordinate pair, (0,0) represents subjects who always chose social information at both
positions G3 and G4, including “herd animals” (who choose social information at all
positions), and also those who may suffer both from “tie neglect” and from “redundancy
neglect”. The medium cluster at the bottom right corner around the coordinate pair (0,1)
is consistent with PE behavior. Finally, the small cluster at the top right corner around
the coordinate pair (1,1) represents “lone wolves”, who always choose private information
(which is in fact empirically optimal given others’ behavior). Overall, subjects choose
private information at G4 significantly less often than at G3 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test
z = 6.49, p = 0.0000).
Finding 6. More subjects choose social information at position G4 than at G3. While
this is consistent with PE behavior, it is nevertheless empirically suboptimal due to the
rate of non-compliance and social information choice at earlier positions.
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5.5 Summary of Overall Patterns in Information Choices
The above-mentioned patterns in subjects’ information choices are well-captured by a
random-effects probit regression analysis reported on in Table 3. This regression makes
use of all of the information choice data (when subjects are in positions P2, G2, G3 and
G4). Relative to position, P2, we observe that subjects exhibit group effects at position
G2 by choosing (optimally) private information more often, tie neglect at position G3 by
choosing (suboptimally) social information more often, and, finally, PE and redundancy
neglect at position G4 by choosing (empirically suboptimally) social information more
often. We further find that there are no order effects as the coefficient on the dummy
variable for the Group-Pair treatment ordering (GP) is insignificantly different from zero,
nor is there any time trend (round number) as indicated by the insignificant coefficient
on the “time” variable.
Privatei,t
G2 0.54***
(0.14)
G3 -1.19***
(0.16)
G4 -2.37***
(0.22)
GP -0.20
(0.20)
time 0.00
(0.01)
cons 0.91***
(0.16)
Wald χ2 180.88
p-value 0.00
No. Obs. 3072.00
Table 3: Random-effects probit regression with binary dependent variable Privatei,t which is equal
to 1 (0) when subject i chooses private (social) information in round t, for all 128 subjects at all 24
information choice positions. G2-G4 are dummy variables. Baseline: position P2 in the PG treatment
ordering. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the group level. (* p-value < 0.10, **
p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01).
Finding 7. Private information is chosen more frequently at position G2 (in a group)
than at position P2 (in a pair). Contrary to PE predictions, there is a strong bias towards
social information at position G3. Finally, at position G4 social information is chosen
more frequently, which is PE optimal, but empirically suboptimal because of the rate of
non-compliance, and social information choice at earlier positions.
The above finding indicates co-existence of both rationality and bias in our data. As
we reported earlier in Finding 2, the aggregate data does not indicate any systematic
bias toward a particular type of information. However, as Finding 7 states, there is a
notable heterogeneity in subjects’ tendencies, with many subjects who select information
optimally in some positions, but not in others. Moreover, while the choice of social
information at position G4 is PE optimal, choosing it is empirically suboptimal and is
consistent with a “triple” neglect, - i.e. a combination of tie neglect, redundancy neglect,
and non-compliance neglect.
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Figure 5: Rates of private and PE information choices, out of all 24 information choices. Left: Dis-
tribution of private information choice rates at all positions (P2, G2, G3, and G4) for all 128 subjects.
Subjects who always choose social (private) information are located on the left- (right-) hand side of the
range. Right: Rates of PE information choices (y-axis) vs. rates of private information choices (x-axis)
for each of 128 subjects. The size of the bubbles is proportional to the number of subjects with a given
pair of values. By construction, the values are constrained by the dashed lines.
A histogram of the aggregate rates of private information choices at positions P2,
G2, G3 and G4 (Figure 5, left panel) reveals a mixture of bias and rationality, as the
distribution of these choices is widely distributed with multiple spikes. At the far left of the
figure, there are “herd animals,” who never or almost never choose private information. At
the opposite corner, there are“lone wolves,” who almost always choose private information
regardless of their position. The largest spike is at the 0.5 proportion, where most subjects
choose private information at position 2 in both the “Pair” and “Group” formations, and
switched to social information at position G3 (possibly due to “tie neglect”) as well as
at position G4 (optimal). A smaller spike at the 0.75 proportion depicts subjects who
mostly switched to social information only at position G4, corresponding to the PE. The
rest of subjects are not “pure” in terms of their information choices; some of them either
update their strategies during the experiment, or do not have stable strategies. Overall,
the mean (SD) proportion of private information choices is 0.531 (0.246) and this is
marginally greater than the median and modal value of 0.5 (one-tailed t-test, p = 0.077),
suggesting a strong presence of tie neglect, and a substantial presence of PE behavior.
The right panel of Figure 5 represents the same data as the joint distribution of private
information choice rates with PE choice rates,10 and provides a graphical representation
of many features and findings of our experiment. First, the dashed lines represent the
constraints on the measures of behavior. For instance, always choosing social information
would be consistent with the PE only 25 percent of the time, namely when in position G4,
hence one vertex of the “quad of rationality” is at the coordinate pair (0,0.25). The other
three vertices follow from the same type of reasoning, and the dashed lines connecting
these vertices provide logical bounds upon the set of all observations. Second, the largest
10The mean (SD) of PE choices is 0.699(0.185), with an empirical range of [0.25, 1].
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group of subjects exhibits “tie neglect”, at coordinate pair (0.5,0.75) which is the novel
bias towards social information that we have identified in our design. Third, a substantial
group of subjects always made PE information choices (coordinate pair (0.75,1). Finally,
there are a noticeable cluster of empirically optimal “lone wolves” at coordinate pair
(1,0.75) and a smaller cluster of suboptimal “herd animals” at coordinate pair (0,0.25).
Finding 8. Relative to the PE, there is substantial individual heterogeneity in information
choices. A large group of subjects suboptimally chose social information at position G3.
PE emerges as the second most prominent behavior, with some (empirically optimal) “lone
wolf” and (suboptimal) “herd animal” types.
6 Results: Information Compliance
Finally, the proportion of subjects’ guesses that followed the information provided at each
of the six positions (i.e., P1-P2 and G1-G4) are reported in Table 4.
Pair Group
Position Private Social Overall Position Private Social Overall
P1 91.8 – 91.8 G1 91.8 – 91.8
P2 92.4 88.2 91.3 G2 93.1 89.4 92.4
– – – – G3 92.0 82.4 86.3
– – – – G4 86.5 92.5 91.5
Table 4: Frequencies of information compliance by position within each formation.
The overall compliance rates (which are equal to the sum of % pf and % sf, from Table
1) are in excess of 85 percent at all positions. Moreover, apart from the complex case of
position G3, there is hardly any difference in compliance rates by those choosing private
or social information (suggesting that the confusion/mistakes in use of information might
be due to some process which is independent of the type of information chosen). This is
possibly because the incentives to comply with private and social information are broadly
similar and are determined by signal accuracy. First, the expected payoff to compliance
with a private signal is always 2/3, and to non-compliance it is 1/3. Second, the expected
payoff to compliance with social information varies both with position in the sequence
and the behavior of other subjects. In Appendix A, we calculate the empirical return to
social information in the experiment, and find that its accuracy is similar to, but below
that of private information.
The left panel of Figure 6 reveals that more than 30 percent of subjects are perfectly
compliant, while at the same time almost 70% of subjects contradict the observed infor-
mation at least once, including almost 40% of subjects who go against the information
they receive at least three times, The worst individual compliance rate is 0.528 (i.e., fol-
lowing the information only a bit more than half of the time). The right panel of Figure
6 shows that, at the individual level there is a positive correlation between information
compliance in the first periods, P1+G1 (where private information is provided by default),
and information compliance in all subsequent positions, P2+G2+G3+G4.
Finding 9. In all positions, subjects optimally complied with the information available
to them more than 85 percent of the time. However, a large majority of subjects, 67
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Figure 6: Information compliance rates, or proportions of guesses where subjects followed the received
information (N of subjects = 128.) Left panel: Distributions of information compliance rates at all
positions combined (P1-P2 and G1-G4). Right panel: Comparison of compliance rates at non-information
choice positions (P1 and G1) versus positions involving information choice (P2 and G2-G4).
percent, used information suboptimally at least once, either going against their private
signal and/or the social information they chose to receive.
7 Conclusion
Our experiment modifies the standard sequential social learning environment to yield
important new insights about information use and group decision-making. In our setting,
subjects have to choose to observe either a private signal or the history of decisions made
by earlier subjects in the sequence (social information) rather than having both types
of information freely supplied to them. In contrast to the standard sequential social
learning setting, our experiment with information choice enables a meaningful within-
subject design, where the same subjects can be assigned to different positions in a sequence
in order to test theoretical predictions that depend on a player’s position in the sequence.
In addition, our within subject analysis allows for the detection of any individual biases
for or against social information.
Our findings suggest that many subjects employ a “more is better” heuristic to valu-
ing social information, despite the fact that this heuristic suffers from a “triple neglect”
of factors that work to diminish the value of social information. First, many subjects
choose social information after the first two guesses, i.e., at position 3, perhaps following
the notion that “two heads are better than one”, but this logic ignores the (very likely)
possibility that the two heads may disagree with one another. We call the latter phe-
nomenon tie neglect. Second, choosing social information later in the sequence may not
be optimal because earlier subjects may already have chosen social information reducing
its informativeness. Not realizing this possibility is known as redundancy neglect. Third,
we document that almost 70% of our subjects fail to comply with the information they
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receive at least once which further erodes the value of social information. We label the
failure to recognize that possibility as non-compliance neglect. These findings challenge
the validity of many earlier social learning studies where mistakes made by subjects can
only be identified in those infrequent cases where both social and private information
agree and yet the subject’s choice is at odds with that information.
Here, while some subjects are unbiased and choose information according to theoret-
ical or empirically optimal strategies, mostly we find subjects who simply choose social
information too early, applying a “more is better” heuristic, and succumbing to “triple
neglect”. In the aggregate, we thus find an overall bias against private information. This
is in contrast to the bias towards overweighting private information, documented in the
metastudy of Weizsa¨cker (2010) for the standard sequential setting - which, by design,
favors mistakes towards overusing private information. This is in further contrast to Duffy
et al. (2018) who considered a design where mistakes can run both ways, and found equal
numbers of “herd animals” who consistently choose social information, and “lone wolves”
who repeatedly choose private information. Overall, this suggests that asymmetry in the
experimental design may be a significant confound in identifying the level and type of
bias for or against social information.
Our results further indicate that when a subject’s decision can be observed by follow-
ers, she chooses private information more frequently than when there are no subsequent
players. By choosing and acting according to that private information, an individual can
help followers by increasing the informativeness of social information. Such group effects
could be one explanation for why subjects were found to be biased toward private infor-
mation in standard social learning experiments relative to equilibrium predictions based
on self-interest.
In summary, we observe heterogeneity in information choice in a sequential social
learning environment. We believe that our findings have important practical implications,
one of which would be for mechanism design. In situations where a social planner is able
to determine the sequence of decision making, lone wolves should be positioned at the
beginning of the sequence and herd animals should never be positioned earlier in the
sequence. Alternatively, it is also possible that if lone wolves and herd animals coexist,
that an endogenously formed sequence can be self-enforcing efficient, as the lone wolves
should prefer to be the leaders in the sequence if waiting is costly, and the herd animals
and rational individuals may rationally choose to be in later positions in the sequence to
wait for the more valuable social information generated by the early-moving lone wolves.
We leave such an extension to future research.
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Appendices
A Empirically Optimal Strategy
In this appendix, we set out how the empirically optimal strategies at each position
n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are calculated. The empirical frequencies of strategies pfn (pnn), choosing
private information and following (not following) it, as well as of strategies sfn (snn),
choosing social information and following (not following) it are taken from Table 1.
The expected return to using and misusing private information are always pi(pfn) =
q = 2
3
and pi(pnn) = 1 − q = 13 , respectively. The empirical frequency that player 1 is
correct is p1 = pf1q + pn1(1 − q) = q − (2q − 1)pn1 < q. Thus, the empirical return to
following social information at position 2, is pi(sf2) = p1 = 0.6393 < q. The empirical
frequency that player 2 is correct is p2 = pf2q+pn2(1−q)+sf2p1+sn2(1−p1) = 0.6386 < q.
The empirical return to following social information at position 3, pi(sf3), by definition,
is the return to following the majority when it exists, or following the player in position
1 in case of a tie. Thus, pi(sf3) = p11 + p10, where p11 is the empirical frequency that
players 1 and 2 are correct in their guesses, p10 is the empirical frequency that player 1
is correct and player 2 is wrong. Taking into account that the success of the players are
not independent when a player chooses social information, we have:
pi(sf3) = p1(pf2q + pn2(1− q)) + p1sf2 + p1(pf2(1− q) + pn2q) + p1sn2 = p1.
Thus, the returns to social information at positions 2 and 3 are identical (see Ma (2018)):
pi(sf3) = pi(sf2) = p1 = q − (2q − 1)pn1 = 0.6393 < q.
Non-compliance at position 1 (pn1) reduces the return to social information at position 3
from 2/3 to 0.639. However, surprisingly the frequency with which social information is
chosen at position 2 has no effect.
At position 4, the theoretical payoff to sf4, choosing social information and following
the majority of the three previous players, is q3 + 3q2(1− q) = 20/27 ≈ 0.741 higher than
q = 2
3
. However, the empirical return to sf4 turns out to be lower:
pi(sf4) = p111 + p110 + p101 + p011 = 0.6622 < q
where p111 is the empirical frequency that players 1, 2 and 3 are correct in their guesses,
p110 is the empirical frequency that 1 and 2 are correct and 3 is wrong, and so on.
The calculations above take into account that, given that some players choose social
information, the success of the players are not independent. For example, if player 1 is
correct, then if player 2 chooses social information, she will be correct too if she follows
it, and so on, and thus
p111 = p1(pf2q + pn2(1− q) + sf2)(pf3q + pn3(1− q) + sf3).
If, instead, player 1 is incorrect, then if player 2 or player 3 choose social information,
either will be correct if she does not follow (again we define following in position 3 by
following player 1 if players 1 and 2 disagree), and thus
p011 = (1− p1)(pf2q + pn2(1− q) + sn2)(pf3q + pn3(1− q) + sn3).
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Figure A.1: Decomposing the return to social information at position 4: Level curves for pi(sf4). Rate
of non-compliance pn (on y-axis) vs. frequency of choice of social information sf3 + sn3 at position 3
(on y-axis), with the empirical average denoted by D. The maximum value pi(sf4) = q
3 + 3q2(1 − q) =
20/27 ≈ 0.741 at the origin. The level curve representing the empirical average of pi(sf4) = 0.662 is in
red, and the level curve representing the return to private information q = 23 is in blue.
We thus calculate that p111 = 0.3604, p110 = 0.0795, p101 = 0.1261 and p011 = 0.0962,
which gives the expected return to social information for player 4 at 0.6622 as above.
To decompose the effect of non-equilibrium behavior on the return to social information
at position 4 is somewhat complicated. However, suppose that the rate of non-compliance
to private information is equal to a constant pn at positions 1, 2 and 3. Suppose further
that sf2 = sn2 = 0, no-one chooses social information at position 2. Then, the return to
social information at position 4 is
pi(sf4) = q
3 + 3q2(1− q)− (1− q)3 (12pn+ 3pn2 − 2pn3 + (2− pn)(1 + pn)(sf3 + sn3))
Both the rate of social information choice at position 3 and the non-compliance rate have
a negative effect on the return to social information at position 4. Further, the marginal
rate of loss from one of these factors is increasing in the other - they reinforce each other.
We can form some further numerical experiments to determine the relative contribu-
tion of these two factors. If we set pn equal to its average empirical value, 0.0573, over the
first three positions, while holding sf3 = sn3 = 0, then pi(sf4) falls from 20/27 ≈ 0.741 to
0.715. If we set pn to zero, and sf3 + sn3 = 0.591, their empirical value, then pi(sf4) falls
from 20/27 ≈ 0.741 to 0.697. This suggests that it is the popularity of social information
at position 3 that is particularly damaging to its value at position 4. If we set pn, sf3 and
sn3 to their empirical values, then pi(sf4) falls from 20/27 ≈ 0.741 to 0.6700, whereas the
actual payoff was almost identical at 0.6622. That is, these two factors together almost
completely explain the low empirical return to social information at position 4. This is
illustrated in Figure A.1.
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B Logit QRE
An alternative theoretical framework is Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium (LQRE) due
to Mckelvey and Palfrey (1995). LQRE has two main advantages. First, LQRE takes the
widely observed “trembling hand” behavior into consideration, and the level of tremble
can be estimated from real experimental data. In addition, instead of a sharp 1 or 0
strategy prediction from PE, LQRE generates predictions in terms of frequencies.
We normalize the payoffs to correct and incorrect guesses to 1 and 0, respectively; and
thus the payoff pi(j) to a strategy j is its probability of it resulting in a correct guess. A
player’s optimality is captured by the parameter µ with 0 < µ <∞: the higher µ is, the
closer is playeri to optimal behavior.
The first player in the sequence faces only two options, to follow the private signal
(pf) or not (pn), thus the LQRE probability of (optimal) following the private signal is:
pf1 =
eµ·pi(pf1)
eµ·pi(pf1) + eµ·pi(pn1)
(2)
All subsequent players in the sequence face all four strategies, and thus the LQRE prob-
ability of following the private signal at position n is:
pfn =
eµ·pi(pfn)
eµ·pi(pfn) + eµ·pi(pnn) + eµ·pi(sfn) + eµ·pi(snn)
,∀k ≥ 2 (3)
Of course, pi(pfn) =
2
3
for all n, the accuracy of a private signal. The payoffs to social
information are endogenous and are calculated in the same way as in the empirical optimal
calculations (in Appendix A above), but using the LQRE frequencies. For example, the
return to following social information at position 2 is p1 = pf1q + pn1(1 − q) as before,
but pf1 is calculated using the logit equation (2). Note that as given in (A), the return
to social information is the same at positions 2 and 3. Consequently, the LQRE strategy
frequencies do not change from position 2 to 3.
In general, the predictions of LQRE depend on the value of µ, the precision parameter.
For players in positions 2 and 3, the qualitatively robust prediction is that they choose
private information more frequently than social, as mistakes by prior players reduce the
expected accuracy of social information. However, at position 4, the value of µ does
matter for determining the modal strategy choice. If µ is sufficiently low, then even in
position 4, play is noisy enough to render social information to be less accurate than
private. Since play frequencies in LQRE reflect relative payoffs, this induces the LQRE
to place greater probability on pf than sf in position 4 if µ is below some threshold
value µˆ. One can calculate that for µ < µˆ = 8.42, the modal action is to choose private
information.
Position pf pn sf sn
1 pf1 = 0.920 pn1 = 0.080 – –
2 pf2 = 0.496 pn2 = 0.043 sf2 = 0.408 sn2 = 0.052
3 pf2 = 0.496 pn2 = 0.043 sf2 = 0.408 sn2 = 0.052
4 pf4 = 0.464 pn4 = 0.040 sf4 = 0.455 sn4 = 0.041
Table B.1: LQRE estimations for each position, for µ ≈ 7.330.
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We estimate the value of µ using maximum likelihood to maximize the fit to the
empirical frequencies given in Table 1. The log likelihood is
logP = C + pˆf 1 log(pf1) + pˆn1 log(pn1) + pˆf 2 log(pf2) + ....+ sˆn4 log(sn4) (4)
where C is a constant, pˆf i indicates the frequency of that strategy in the data and pfi the
theoretical probability of the strategy as given in (2) or (3). The value of µ that maximizes
this likelihood is µ = 7.330. This is then used to generate the strategy frequencies given in
Table B.1. The value for µ is below µˆ, so with the estimated empirical return, the LQRE
predicts social information is less accurate than private even at position 4. Indeed, the
LQRE value for pi(sf4) = 0.6639 is very close to the estimated empirical value of 0.6622.
This is below the return to private information of 2
3
. Thus, the LQRE frequencies place
a greater weight on pf4 than sf4.
C Order Effect
As Figure C.1 shows, the distributions of information choices do not differ significantly
between “GP” and “PG” treatment orderings (two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p =
0.84). Using Mann-Whitney test, we find no difference in information choices between
the two treatment orderings at position 2 in both “Pair” ( 72.7 vs. 72.1, p=0.87) and
“Group” (82.0 vs. 83.6, p=0.57) formations; but subjects in “PG” treatment ordering are
more likely to choose private information at positions G3 (35.9 vs. 45.8, p=0.01) and G4
(13.8 vs. 19.0, p=0.05). However, controlling for individual differences among subjects,
there is no order effect in the regression results in Section E.
Figure C.1: Distributions of total number of private information choices, by treatment ordering: PG
(green) vs. GP (white), for 64 subjects in each treatment ordering.
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D Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Individual Charac-
teristics
In the third part of the experiment, we collected self-reported individual characteristics.
Out of 128 subjects, 33.6% were males and 66.4% females. While a significant majority
(84.4%) of our subjects are undergraduate students, the average (median) age is 22.9 (21)
years, as our participants included mature students, postgraduate students, as well as a
small number (3.1%) of non-students.
To quantify subjects’ cognitive abilities, we used a multiple choice version of Frederick
(2005)’s free-form Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), (labeled CRTMCQ (multipl,e choice
question (MCQ) format). This test is frequently used to differentiate between “system 1”
and “system 2” thinking (Kahneman (2011)) as the three questions each have an obvious
but incorrect answer reflecting system 1 type thinking. The correct answer requires more
deliberative reflection, or system 2 thinking. Thus, higher CRT scores are associated with
higher cognitive reflection, and thus possibly lower rates of non-compliance neglect, tie
neglect or redundancy neglect. The CRT scores range between 0 and 3, and the mean
(SD) CRT score in our experiment is 1.29 (1.18) and the median is 1.
Figure D.1: Distributions of CRTMCQ for all 128 subjects (left panel), and GREQ for the applicable
119 subjects (right panel).
Following a methodology used in Duffy et al. (2017), we also imputed subjects’ cogni-
tive abilities based on subjects’ self-reported programme of university study (or major).
Specifically, we used the average scores on the quantitative section of the GRE General
Test (GREQ) associated with each subjects’ self-reported programme of study, or “major”
(see Educational Testing Service (2014, Table 4) as the subjects’ assigned GRE quanti-
tative score, labeled GREQ. We were able to impute GREQ scores for 119 subjects (the
remaining 9 subjects were either not associated with any university programme, or the
GRE scores were not available for their self-reported programme of study). The mean
(SD) imputed GREQ score is 153.63 (4.51) and the median is 151. These two cognitive
proxies, CRTMCQ and GREQ, are highly correlated in our data with a correlation coef-
ficient r(CRTMCQ, GREQ) = 0.30 that is significantly positive p-value= 0.00, Further,
males have higher values of both cognitive proxies as reported in Table D.1. Figure D.1
provides the distributions of these two proxies.
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female Age CRTMCQ GREQ
female 1
age -0.142 1
CRTMCQ -0.276
∗∗∗ 0.061 1
GREQ -0.437
∗∗∗ -0.003 0.305∗∗∗ 1
F1Contra -0.181∗∗ 0.131 0.079 0.240∗∗∗
F2SocReg -0.133 -0.182∗∗ 0.016 0.051
F3ToM 0.020 -0.094 -0.077 -0.068
F4Altru 0.125 -0.062 -0.055 -0.278∗∗∗
F5Aloof -0.179∗∗ -0.037 0.069 0.141
F6Trust -0.175∗∗ 0.032 0.103 0.103
Table D.1: Pairwise correlations between individual characteristics. By construction, factors F1-F6 are
uncorrelated with each other. (* p-value< 0.10, ** p-value< 0.05, *** p-value< 0.01.)
Subjects’ individual non-cognitive characteristics (sometimes referred to as personality
traits), may also affect their behavior in our experiment, – for example, by biasing subjects
towards or against a particular type of information.11 We conducted an individual traits
survey with 30 six-point scale questions, using some questions from Costa and McCrae
(1992), Duffy and Kornienko (2010), and Duffy et al (2017), as well as our own (see
Table D.2). Subjects indicated the extent of their agreement or disagreement with these
statements using a 6-point Likert scale.
Based on subjects’ responses, we developed proxies for these non-cognitive traits.
First, we kept all 30 questions as the standard reliability test statistic, Cronbach’s α,
is 0.755 and thus satisfied the recommended cut-off value of 0.75. The common factor
analysis rendered six factors with eigenvalues greater than unity, with uniqueness values
on all questions less than the cut-off value of 0.7, and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure
of sampling adequacy equal to 0.734, a “middling” value (see, e.g. Duffy and Kornienko
(2010) for the methodology). Second, we applied a common factor analysis to this survey
data, and found 6 latent factors. Based on the signs and magnitudes of the factor loadings
as reported in Table D.2, we give these six factors the following interpretations. Factor
“F1Contra” (the strongest factor, explaining 30.1% of variability) can be interpreted as a
tendency for being contradictory and independent; factor “F2SocReg” (21.7%) represents
a tendency for having social regret; factor “F3ToM” (15.3%) is a tendency for having
“theory of mind”; factor “F4Altru” (9.5%) is a tendency for altruism; factor “F5Aloof”
(8.5%) is a tendency for not being interested in social interactions and being non-rivalrous;
factor “F6Trust” (7.2%) is a tendency to trust others.
By construction, the six personality trait factors are themselves uncorrelated. There
is also no significant correlation between CRTMCQ and predicted values for any of the
six factors. However, we found gender differences in the predicted values of factors for
each subject (see Table D.1). Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Weisberg et al,
2011), females are less contradictory (less independent). In addition, males are more
socially detached and trust others more. Furthermore, age is negatively correlated with
a tendency for social regret, and imputed GREQ scores are positively correlated with a
tendency to contradict and negatively with tendency to be altruistic.
11The effect of personality on information choice is also explored in Fre´chette et al. (2017).
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E Explaining Heterogeneity with Individual Charac-
teristics
Here, we explore whether the self-reported individual characteristics (see Appendix D).
can explain the individual heterogeneity in behavior.
We start with exploring individual patterns in information choice. To account for
possible censoring, we conduct a Tobit regression analysis over the rates of choice of
private information, at position n ∈ P2, G2, G3, G4 (see Table E.1).
Privatein P2 G2 G3 G4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PrivateiP2 1.20*** 0.19 0.32
(0.26) (0.29) (0.34)
PrivateiG2 0.98*** 0.73*** 0.13
(0.17) (0.25) (0.40)
PrivateiG3 0.22 0.69*** 1.35***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.29)
PrivateiG4 0.37 -0.29 1.40***
(0.24) (0.23) (0.28)
GP 0.18 0.21* 0.04 -0.02 -0.19 -0.11 -0.39 -0.29
(0.14) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.27) (0.24)
female 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.11 0.29 0.31 -0.26 -0.31
(0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.17) (0.24) (0.20) (0.23) (0.21)
age 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
CRTMCQ 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.11 -0.07 0.02 -0.00 -0.09 -0.10
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10)
F1Contra 0.08 0.05 0.01 -0.08 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.08
(0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
F2SocReg -0.05 -0.02 -0.10 -0.07 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.04
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12)
F3ToM -0.07 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.24* 0.31***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.13) (0.10)
F4Altru -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04
(0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13) (0.11)
F5Aloof -0.19** -0.24** 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.01 -0.02
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.17) (0.13)
F6Trust 0.02 -0.03 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.10 -0.11 -0.12
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12)
cons 0.48 -0.45 1.27*** 0.56** -0.28 -1.08*** -0.82 -1.38**
(0.36) (0.42) (0.39) (0.26) (0.52) (0.38) (0.67) (0.66)
F-test 2.63 13.56 0.69 4.88 1.09 7.12 1.63 3.21
p-value 0.01 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.11 0.00
Pseudo-R2 0.13 0.31 0.03 0.28 0.03 0.18 0.07 0.26
No. Obs. 128.00 128.00 128.00 128.00 128.00 128.00 128.00 128.00
Table E.1: Tobit regressions on each subject’s of private information rates in each position n, censored
at 0 and 1. Robust standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the group level. (* p-value< 0.10, **
p-value< 0.05, *** p-value< 0.01).
Comparing the two regression specifications in Table E.1 for each position, choices of
private information are strongly positively inter-correlated across some of the positions,
30
suggesting “patterns” of subject behavior. But individual characteristics can hardly ex-
plain subjects’ biases for or against private information. The exceptions are at position
P2, where the (optimal) choice of private information is correlated with the cognitive
proxy CRTMCQ, and is negatively correlated with a lack of interest in social interactions,
and at position G4, where subjects with higher “theory of mind” are marginally more
likely to choose (empirically optimal) private information.
Finding 10. Overall, with a few exceptions, there is not much effect of cognitive and
non-cognitive measures on subjects’ choice of private information.
We also explore the information compliance rates, how often each subject i followed
the information they chose to observe. As Table E.2 shows, the cognitive proxy CRTMCQ
is significantly positively correlated with the compliance rate for “All” (both private
and social) information (specification 1). Yet this correlation is entirely attributable
to subjects who rationally follow private information, since no traits explain subjects’
compliance rates when they chose social information, as reflected by insignificant F–test
for specification (5).
Compliancei All P1+G1 P2+G2+G3+G4
(1) All (2) Private (3) All (4) Private (5) Social
GP 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.07 -0.03
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04)
female 0.00 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.02
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.11) (0.05)
age 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
CRTMCQ 0.03*** 0.05* 0.04*** 0.11*** 0.04*
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
F1Contra -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 -0.05 0.00
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
F2SocReg 0.02* 0.02 0.03** 0.08** 0.00
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
F3ToM -0.03* -0.07** -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
F4Altru 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
F5Aloof -0.00 -0.04 -0.00 0.00 -0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02)
F6Trust -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.06 -0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
cons 0.82*** 0.85*** 0.83*** 1.00*** 1.00***
(0.06) (0.16) (0.06) (0.16) (0.09)
F-test 2.94 2.62 4.51 2.33 0.74
p-value 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.68
Pseudo-R2 -0.95 0.17 1.75 0.14 0.08
No. Obs. 128.00 128.00 128.00 125.00 121.00
Table E.2: Tobit regression on each subject’s compliance rates Compliancei, censored at 0 and 1.
Robust standard errors (in brackets) clustered at the group level. Last two specifications exclude subjects
who never chose relevant information. (* pvalue < 0.10, ** pvalue < 0.05, *** pvalue < 0.01).
Finding 11. Subjects with a higher proxy measure for cognitive ability (CRTMCQ score)
follow the information they choose to receive more frequently.
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We further conduct random-effects probit regressions (see Table E.3). Relatively to
position P2, subjects favor private information at G2 (group effects); favor social infor-
mation at G3 (tie neglect); and favor social information at G4 (triple neglect/PE) (see
Table E.3, specifications (1)-(4)). Except at position G3, information compliance rate is
similar across all 6 positions, and is strongly correlated with cognitive proxy CRTMCQ
(see Table E.3, specifications (5)-(8)).
Privatei,t Followi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
P2 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
G1 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
G2 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
G3 -1.19*** -1.19*** -1.19*** -0.38*** -0.39*** -0.39***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
G4 -2.37*** -2.37*** -2.37*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
GP -0.20 -0.13 -0.10 -0.07 -0.01 0.09 0.11 0.11
(0.20) (0.22) (0.23) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
time 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
female -0.04 0.07 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00
(0.20) (0.21) (0.13) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19)
age 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CRTMCQ 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.19***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
F1Contra 0.13 0.09 -0.04 -0.03
(0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
F2SocReg 0.05 0.03 0.11** 0.11**
(0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
F3ToM 0.01 -0.00 -0.12 -0.12
(0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
F4Altru -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
F5Aloof 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.03
(0.15) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
F6Trust 0.09 0.06 -0.00 -0.00
(0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
cons 0.91*** 0.10 0.03 -0.44 1.70*** 1.09*** 1.02*** 0.94**
(0.16) (0.72) (0.78) (0.53) (0.15) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37)
Wald χ2 180.88 236.37 375.42 11.00 26.49 43.40 100.29 34.35
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
No. Obs. 3072.00 3072.00 3072.00 3072.00 4608.00 4608.00 4608.00 4608.00
Table E.3: Random-effects probit regressions. (1)-(4): dummy variable Privatei,t indicates whether
subject i chose private information in round t at 24 relevant positions (baseline: P2 in PG ordering).
(5)-(8): dummy variable Followi,t indicates whether subject i followed either private signal, or subject in
P1/G1, or majority in G4, in round t at all 36 positions (baseline: P1 in PG ordering). Robust standard
errors (in brackets) clustered at the group level. (* pvalue < 0.10, ** pvalue < 0.05, *** pvalue < 0.01).
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